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Gender, Visibility and Public Space in Refugee
Claims on the Basis of Sexual Orientation
Jenni Millbank1
In recent years, many Western refugee-receiving countries have accepted
that lesbians and gay men may be eligible refugee claimants through the
“membership of a particular social group” category of the Refugees
Convention.2 Key receiving nations such as Germany,3 the USA,4 and
Canada5 in the late 1980s and early 1990s accepted that lesbians and gay
men might belong to a particular social group.6 Australia followed suit in
19947 and the UK, after many conflicting decisions, accepted eligibility
only in 1999.8 In 2002, the European Parliament voted to broaden the draft
European Commission Directive on the definition of a refugee to explicitly
include sexual orientation, gender identity and HIV status as elements of the
particular social group category.9
However, eligibility to bring a claim is only the first step in the refugee
determination process. Although the definition of refugee is universal and
the elements of the decisions on particular social group claims based on
sexual orientation are apparently straightforward (are lesbians and gay men
a particular social group in the sending country?10 is the person lesbian or
gay? are they, or will they be, in danger of persecution on that basis?), the
manner in which these questions are asked and answered is deeply inflected
with gendered notions of the public and the private. The case law is full of
gendered and sexualised assumptions about identity and public space that
demand close analysis and critique.
In our comparative study of refugee decisions on sexuality from Canada
and Australia11 we found a stark contrast between lesbians trapped in their
homes, persecuted by their families, and gay men entrapped in parks and
toilets, persecuted by the police. Lesbians had great difficulty grounding
their claims, as their experiences were “too private,” while the experiences
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of gay men were often characterised as “too public.” Our initial sense was
that lesbians and gay men occupied quite separate, gendered realms, with
little to connect them. However, there was a clear theme across the cases:
the “proper place” of both lesbian and gay sexual identity was in the private
domain. Gay and lesbian presence in the public domain was repeatedly
characterised as one of transgression. There echoed a profound disapproval
of publicly declared gay or lesbian identity, both in the sending countries
and in the Australian decisions. This exclusion from the public transcended
gender and coalesced around the theme of visibility. It is through an
analysis of the links between visibility and violence that I am drawn to
argue that a feminist-centred refugee jurisprudence must recognise and
respect sexual self-determination on the part of lesbian and gay asylum
seekers.
The latter part of this paper makes a feminist argument for the protection
of public gay sex by linking it to the overarching issue of sexual selfdetermination, which concerns both lesbians and gay men in the site of
refugee jurisprudence. This analysis connects decision-makers’ policing of
public expression with the continual process of bodily self-management and
self-surveillance that lesbians and gay men undergo as part of their daily
lives.

PRIVATE HOUSES
Research on the gendered nature of homophobic violence in Western
receiving countries has documented that lesbians face significantly more
private violence than gay men—they are more likely to be harassed and
assaulted at home or at work rather than on the streets, and are more likely
to be attacked by men known to them, such as neighbours or former
partners.12 Lesbians are also more likely than gay men to face sexual or
sexualised forms of assault.13 In this way, violence against lesbians
demonstrates some similarities to violence against heterosexual women.
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Much feminist refugee literature has explored the difficulties that women
(who are presumably heterosexual)14 experience in asylum claims.15 The
domestic or semi-private nature of the persecution of women, the use of
sexual assault as a method of persecution and the difficulty of establishing a
state nexus (for example, in situations of state indifference to domestic
violence or rape) have been continuing themes in refugee claims by women
in general. These factors were strongly present in the lesbian cases we
analysed.
Lesbian claimants were remarkable firstly for their absence from refugee
cases.16 When lesbians did appear, they often failed to receive asylum, with
an overall success rate that was considerably lower than that of men.
However, this overall figure masked a sharp disparity: in Canada, lesbian
claimants actually had a slightly higher success rate than gay men17 while in
Australia lesbian claimants were overwhelmingly unsuccessful.18
In the Australian tribunal, lesbian applicants frequently failed because
their experience was characterised as “merely private.” A stunning example
concerns a 1999 claim by a lesbian from Bolivia.19 The claimant had been
subject to violence, harassment and sexual assault by several men in her
neighbourhood as a result of a male relative telling people that she was a
lesbian, “because he hoped that if they all insulted and attacked her, she
would change.” The tribunal held that it was:
…a purely private matter and…not exerted for reasons of the
Applicant’s membership of a particular social group of
homosexuals. There is no evidence to suggest that…other
homosexuals were threatened or harmed by him or his
associates…The tribunal accepts that although Bolivian society,
and many other societies or communities generally disapprove of
homosexuality, the Applicant’s relative’s motivation to ‘cure’ her
of homosexuality is directed solely at the Applicant, a family
relation.20
The study found that the private had multiple impacts on lesbian asylum
claims. The experience of violence in the private realm made it difficult for
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many lesbian claimants to satisfy the public state nexus component of the
refugee definition. In addition, decision-makers’ projected conceptions of
appropriate gender norms meant that what was characterised as private was
shifting and unpredictable. Experiences that were arguably public (such as
police harassment or failure to protect) and which ought to thereby satisfy
the state nexus requirement, were re-construed as private in the sense that
the experiences were viewed as individually motivated or as provoked by
the lesbian applicant.21 It was not simply that lesbian experience did not fit
the pre-existing mould demanded by refugee law; our analysis suggested a
continually shifting public/private divide in which the public side was as
perilous as the private.
While the Canadian tribunal displayed considerable sensitivity to gender
issues, the Australian tribunal rarely, if ever, appeared to consider the
specific human rights of lesbian women. The Australian tribunal frequently
subsumed lesbian women under the implicitly heterosexual category of
‘women’ or implicitly male category of ‘homosexual.’ Acknowledging and
interrogating gender in lesbian refugee decisions is vital, as ignoring gender
has systematically disadvantaged lesbian claimants. Yet, alertness to
gender in sexuality-based claims should not obscure the links that arise
across gender. These links revolve around the themes of choice, visibility
and public space. While the lesbian cases clearly did reflect gendered
assumptions about women’s relationship to the private, they also reflected
hetero-normative assumptions about queer sexuality as a sexualised rupture
of the (natural) public order.

PUBLIC TOILETS
Male claimants in our study had both a much larger number of total
claims and a higher rate of overall success in their claims than did women.
In general, it was easier for gay men to make out the public aspects of their
cases to establish a state nexus. They were more likely than lesbians to
have come to the notice of the police and to have been persecuted directly
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or refused assistance by them. However, gay men who experienced
persecution as a result of their presence in gay cruising locales or ‘beats’—
such as parks, public toilets or other public or semi-public locations—were
in danger of being characterised by decision-makers as the deserving
objects of neutral criminal law because of their own sexual (or sexualised)
transgressions.22 This approach is inexcusable. There is an enormous range
of information available on the discriminatory enforcement of public order
and public decency laws being used as a weapon of oppression against
sexual minorities in a wide range of countries.23
Only when the applicant’s conduct could be construed as a result of
necessity rather than choice was protection offered in the Australian case
law. In a series of cases involving men who had been attacked on beats,
decision-makers reasoned that if beats were the only available gay venue in
the applicant’s locale, or the only anonymous (and therefore ‘safe’ or
‘discreet’) option available, the applicant’s presence in the beats could be a
legitimate expression of identity, and by extension a legitimate use of public
space.24 Public identification, including sexual expression, short of actual
sex, was thereby permissible in order to achieve sex in private. In this line
of decisions, beats were lifted from the public and re-configured as a step
on the road to private sex. As a result, beats were expressly protected
because of their (real or imagined) proximity to the private. The propriety
of excluding (homo)sexuality from the public was perversely reinforced by
the public sex cases, many of which juxtaposed the permitted innate need of
secretly visiting beats with the impermissible public homosexual conduct or
flaunting, which involved a choice. The classic example of unacceptable
homosexual choice was handholding in public.
Just as positive decisions for gay men erased the public, they also tended
to erase sexual agency or choice. In an earlier article I posed several
questions: Is it possible to articulate an expression of public sexuality in a
human rights framework if it involves choice?25 Is it possible to discuss
public gay sex as an expression of culture as well as individual identity and
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sexuality? And, is it possible to do so in a feminist manner? At first blush,
the role of public sex has little, if anything, to do with lesbian experience.
Public sex, and most especially anonymous public sex, is very much a male
experience and few lesbians are ever likely to emulate it.26 But, does the
simple fact that lesbians are not (generally)27 having public sex enough to
preclude its relevance to lesbians or to feminist analysis?

I WANT TO HOLD YOUR HAND
Refugee protection routinely attaches to sexuality only where it is, or is
seen as, the result of necessity and not choice. Applicants are protected
because they cannot help being gay, and therefore cannot help being
persecuted for being gay, because they cannot help expressing their gayness
somehow. The language of public visibility particularly marked the
suppression of choice. In the Australian decisions on sexuality, it was
frequently repeated that there is no human right to publicly embrace, to
flaunt, proclaim, parade or hold hands.28 Gail Mason has argued that the
trope of visibility is “the crystallisation of assumptions that circulate in
contemporary western nations regarding the appropriateness, or otherwise,
of expressions and representations of homosexuality.”29 Mason continues:
We need look no further than the popular and longstanding refrain
against those who ‘flaunt’ their homosexuality to realise that the
very suggestion that homosexuality can be flaunted is itself the
product of the social and political hush that has historically
enveloped the subject of same-sex sexuality. Whilst the cultural
mandate to conceal one’s homosexuality may have waned, the
knowledge that it is possible to do so continues to serve as the
favoured benchmark against which all representations of
homosexuality are measured. (emphasis in original)30
Although Mason’s work on homophobia-related violence is located in
Australia, her argument that it is not possible to consider the full social
implications of such violence in isolation from sexual visibility is apposite.
The benchmark of invisibility makes it possible in the case law for decision-
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makers to produce such conundrums as a “thriving but discreet homosexual
community” in Colombia where “homosexuality is practised freely in
private” but “public displays…entail some risk.”31 The Australian decisionmakers’ expectations that homosexuality could and should be secret
likewise enabled the paradoxical conclusion that a number of extremely
repressive regimes, such as Iran, were “tolerant” of homosexuality (as long
as it was kept completely invisible).32
The Australian tribunal has issued divided decisions, expressing an
ongoing conflict over whether applicants must be discreet in their home
countries so as to avoid persecution.33 One third of Australian cases raised
the issue of secrecy, or discretion, and one fifth expressly required it of
applicants. The tribunal expressed the discretion requirement as a
“reasonable expectation that persons should, to the extent that it is possible,
co-operate in their own protection.”34 This requirement effectively reverses
the responsibility of a state to ensure protection from persecution and places
the onus instead on the applicant.
The deeply embedded hetero-normativity of such a requirement is well
exposed in the tribunal’s own words:
It is not an infringement of a fundamental human right if one is
required, for safety’s sake, simply not to proclaim that sexuality
openly. Individuals of a variety of sexual orientations live side by
side in a society like Ghana and practise their sexual orientations
privately without feeling a need to proclaim these orientations to
the general public. The public manifestation of homosexuality is
not an essential ingredient of being homosexual.35
The Australian tribunal confined homosexual identity to homosexual sex,
and as a corollary sexualised all manifestations of homosexual identity.
Public sex, kisses in the park, and handholding on the street all became
merged under the rubric of “sexual displays.” While homosexuality was
received as a display, a proclamation or a visual and sexual performance,
heterosexuality disappeared into its own cultural cloak, and in the tribunal’s
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understanding, was never public or performed. Heterosexuality is so
naturalised that, even as a pretence undertaken by closeted gay people in
fear of their lives, it was still posited as normal. In a 1998 case concerning
a gay man from Sri Lanka, the tribunal wrote:
The evidence is that he can avoid a real chance of serious harm
simply by refraining from making his sexuality widely known - by
not saying that he is homosexual and not engaging in public
displays of affection towards other men. He will be able to
function as a normal member of society if he does this. This does
not seem to me to involve any infringement of fundamental human
rights (emphasis added).36
In its “discretion decisions,” the Australian tribunal expressly
determined, and indeed policed, the boundaries of acceptable behaviour
around a shifting public/private divide that centred on a concept of the
visible. In marked contrast, in the vast majority of Canadian cases, the
Canadian tribunal did not impose a discretion requirement. In 1995, the
Immigration Review Board (IRB) rejected the “discretion” requirement in
the strongest terms:
There are many ways of ‘hiding.’ One can conceal oneself in a
cave, or an attic, or a friend’s apartment. One can also attempt to
hide one’s race, religion, nationality or indeed any one of the
attributes of the person which fall under Convention grounds—for
example, by practising the official state religion in public and
one’s own faith only in secret, or by carrying false identification
and ‘passing’ for someone of another race or nationality.
At the heart of the Convention definition of a refugee is the
concept that no person should face a reasonable chance of
persecution because of her or his race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion. To
deny refugee status to someone who cannot or will not conceal one
of these immutable or fundamental attributes, on the grounds that
by such a concealment he or she could remove the fear of
persecution, would make a mockery of the Convention. 37
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In 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered the
claim of a Mexican man who identified as gay but also sometimes crossdressed as a woman. The applicant’s claim was rejected at the first hearing
and again on appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA
held that the way the applicant appeared in public was a choice, and that
therefore his “mistreatment arose from his conduct.” (In the Australian
parlance, he was a flaunter). The Court of Appeals forcefully rejected the
premise that the onus was on the applicant to avoid the persecution:
Perhaps, then, by ‘conduct,’ the BIA was referring to
Geovanni’s effeminate dress or his sexual orientation as a gay
man, as a justification for the police officer’s raping him. The ‘you
asked for it’ excuse for rape is offensive to this court and has been
discounted by courts and commentators alike.38
The Canadian tribunal often explicitly credited applicants with the right
to be publicly identified as gay or lesbian and connected being openly gay
with concepts such as self-identity, self-respect and self-expression.
However, visibility still arose as a major axis of understanding lesbian and
gay experience in the Canadian decisions. For instance, the Canadian
tribunal was prepared to assume that applicants who were resolutely
closeted would continue to live that way indefinitely and that such lack of
visibility would eradicate or reduce their risk of persecution. The tribunal
would deny claims based on this assumption.39 Although applicants were
not required to hide their sexuality, if it appeared that they would blend into
the background, the Canadian tribunal was content to leave them there.40
Eve Sedgwick has been much quoted on her claim that the closet is the
defining metaphor of modern Western homosexuality.41 Sedgwick and
many others have demonstrated that this metaphor is an ill-fitting one,
expressing a dichotomous and essentialised understanding of both identity
and visibility.42 In a recent UK case, a gay man from Pakistan explicitly
argued that if refouled he would be in danger because he was an openly gay
man. The English tribunal, and the Court of the Queen’s Bench on appeal,
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held that he was not really out because neither his work colleagues nor his
family knew that he was gay. Hence, they reasoned, being out was not
accomplished and being closeted back in Pakistan was still a viable option
(which they thus imposed upon him).43 In reality, one is never completely
closeted or completely out, as if these are static, universal and opposing
states. Rather, the degree to which a lesbian expresses her sexual identity
encompasses a continual process of choice on her part. Moreover, the
extent to which she is seen as a lesbian will depend upon the degree of
surveillance to which she is subject, and upon the interpretative processes of
those who are viewing her.
While one may be able to maintain a closeted life in Jordan or
Bangladesh for weeks, months or years, the state of closeted-ness is always
a potentially permeable one. An unconscious gesture, an inquisitive
neighbour, a 20-year cohabitation with “a friend” or a change of heart
render the state of closeted-ness always a potentially permeable one . Many
applicants, from countries as varied as Malaysia, India, Bangladesh and
Iran, testified that to remain unmarried through adulthood would in and of
itself be interpreted as evidence that they were homosexual and expose
them to risk. It is arguable that in such cultures even an applicant who
desperately wishes to, and takes all possible steps to, remain closeted, in
fact becomes increasingly visible with the passage of time. Yet both
tribunals were prepared to accept—to different degrees—the closet as a
stable, safe and permanent home to applicants.
Non-conformity is inextricably linked to the visible, as it is through being
seen as different that the applicants were at risk. To return to Gail Mason’s
work on the experience of homophobia related violence, she explored the
extent to which subjects “managed” their own visibility and negotiated
public space by asking about held hands. The question received a
consistent, indeed overwhelming, response: “it depends.”
[I]t depends on the atmosphere and terrain of each and every
situation as it arises; it depends on the possible repercussions; it
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depends on the short-term and long-term significance of any
negative responses; it depends on staying attuned to the situation,
and so on. No one said, ‘I always feel safe enough to display such
affection.’ No one said, ‘I never feel safe enough to display such
affection.’ The decision to hold hands or kiss was always a
question of weighing up the risks and rewards.44
This process of weighing up the risks and rewards of visibility against a
background of threatened or experienced violence is one undertaken
constantly by lesbians and gay men. These risks, wherever they occur in
the world, are always a question of choice in the face of constraint. The
constraints vary, but my argument is that whether undertaken in China or
Bangladesh, in a home, a hotel room, a public street or a public toilet, such
choices about risk and visibility are the applicant’s, not the decisionmaker’s, to make.

CONCLUSION
This analysis of the role of the private in the lesbian domestic cases, the
public sex aspect of the gay men’s cases and the discretion requirement that
has so disadvantaged both lesbians and gay men, leads me at the very least
to urge a rethink on the use of privacy rights or privacy discourse as a tool
for lesbians and gay men in international law. Wayne Morgan argues that
privacy “cannot provide an analytic structure to theorise power,” and goes
on to argue that as a legal tool it reinforces the “dangerousness of homosex”
and disempowers lesbians and gay men by reifying the view that queer
sexuality has “no acceptable public face.”45
A sense of ensnarement in a perilous public/private divide makes me
greatly reluctant to use any concept of the private in defending lesbian and
gay subjects, and makes me equally wary of abandoning gay men who are
too public in their sexual choices. Moreover, many queer activists and
theorists have warned against gaining inclusion for some good lesbians or
gay men at the cost of producing outsiders.46
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Kris Walker and Wayne Morgan have both proposed the concept of
sexual self-determination in international law and argued that this concept
embodies more than “a simple assertion of a right to liberty.”47 Walker
argues that this is a transformative project, not limited to formal equality or
privacy claims. Her argument is that “[r]ather than merely seeking an
absence of state regulation of behaviour, sexual self-determination also
seeks to achieve the conditions under which individuals can make choices
about their sexuality.”48 This concept may well be a workable one to
address the concerns outlined in this paper where choices about visibility
and sexual agency were routinely denied both by persecutory regimes and
by decision-makers, particularly those in Australia.
In this paper I have focused upon agency and visibility as key concepts in
refugee law on sexuality. I argue that feminist-centred, or feminist-aware,
refugee jurisprudence must protect lesbians and gay men as sexual subjects.
In doing so, laws and processes must respect lesbian and gay choices and
offer protection when, where, and if they choose to take chances.

1

Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Sydney. This paper is based on research
devised and undertaken with Catherine Dauvergne, Canada Research Chair in Migration
Law, University of British Columbia. This is a summary of the paper presented at
Assimilation and Resistance: Emerging Issues in Law and Sexuality, held at Seattle
University School of Law, September 20-21 2002, and I would like to thank the
organisers for making my participation in that conference possible. Thanks to Tiffany
Hambley, Arlie Loughnan and Georgina Perry for research assistance on the project.
2
The legal definition of a refugee is a standard one, drawn from the refugee convention
and adopted into the domestic law of the receiving nations. Article 1A(2) of the
Convention defines a refugee as any person who:
[O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having
a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1A(2), 189 U.N.T.S.
150, 152, as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967,
art. 1, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268.
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3
Verwaltungsgericht Weisbaden [VGW], No IV/I E 06244/81, (Unreported, April 26,
1983). This unpublished decision of the Administrative Court in Weisbaden is
summarised in Maryellen Fullerton, Persecution Due to Membership in a Particular
Social Group: Jurisprudence in the Federal Republic of Germany, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
381, 408–10 (1990).
4
Matter of Toboso Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (1990).
5
The first Canadian case to accept sexual orientation as an eligible basis under the
particular social group definition was Re R. (U.W.) [Oct. 7, 1991] C.R.D.D. 501 I.R.B.
U91-03331 (Immigr. and Refugee Bd. of Can., Conventional Refugee Determination
Div.) (Note, however, that this case contained a sharp dissent). Several more cases were
decided at tribunal level before this approach was confirmed at the judicial level in the
Supreme Court of Canada obiter Ward v Att’y Gen., [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.).
6
In 1995, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) accepted that
lesbians and gay men may constitute members of a “particular social group” and be
eligible for protection under the terms of the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees. United Nations High Commission on Refugees, Protecting Refugees:
Questions and Answers (Feb. 1, 2002), available at http://www.unhcr.ch. Since then a
number of European nations, such as Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland and
Sweden have accepted lesbian and gay asylum seekers on the grounds of sexuality related
persecution. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CRIMES OF HATE, CONSPIRACY OF
SILENCE: TORTURE AND ILL TREATMENT BASED ON SEXUAL IDENTITY (2001), available
at http://www.amnesty.org.
7
In Australia, the first case was RRT Reference N93/00593 (Refugee Rev. Trib., Austl.
Jan. 25, 1994). Some years passed (during which cases usually referred to the Supreme
Court of Canada decision Ward v. Att’y Gen., [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689) before this view was
judicially confirmed in High Court obiter. Applicant A v. Minister for Immigr. & Ethnic
Affairs (1997) 142 A.L.R. 331 (Austl.).
8
Regina v. Immigr. Appeal Trib. ex parte Shah, 2 A.C. 629 (H.L. 1999). Prior to this
time there were conflicting decisions. See Derek McGhee, Persecution and Social Group
Status, 14 J. REFUGEE STUD. 20 (2001); MARK SYMES, CASELAW ON THE REFUGEE
CONVENTION: THE UNITED KINGDOM’S INTERPRETATION IN LIGHT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITIES (2000).
9
The final decision remains with the European Council of Ministers, but if passed
would cover all its member nations and so broaden considerably the range of countries
evaluating, many for the first time, refugee claims on the basis of sexual orientation. See
Justice and Home Affairs: European Parliament Backs a Broader Definition of Refugee,
EUR. REP., Oct. 23, 2002.
10
This step has been undertaken in a very cursory fashion in the Australian cases. See
Catherine Dauvergne & Jenni Millbank, Before the High Court: Applicants S396/2002
and S395/2002, A Gay Refugee Couple From Bangladesh, 25 SYDNEY L. REV. 97
(2003).
11
Focusing on the six-year period from 1994–2000. Of the decisions studied, 127 were
Canadian and 204 were Australian. Considering all claims, 35% of decisions were
favourable to the applicant. In Australia only 22% of claims overall were successful,
while in Canada the figure was more than double that, at 54%. See Jenni Millbank,
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Imagining Otherness: Refugee Claims on the Basis of Sexuality in Canada and Australia,
26 MELB. U. L. REV. 144, 148–49 (2002). See also Catherine Dauvergne & Jenni
Millbank, Burdened by Proof: How the Australian Tribunal System has Failed Lesbian
and Gay Asylum Seekers, 31 FED. L. REV.(forthcoming 2003).
12
See Gail Mason, Heterosexed Violence: Typicality and Ambiguity, in HOMOPHOBIC
VIOLENCE 23 (Gail Mason & Stephen Tomsen eds, 1997).
13
Id.
14
But note that there is a chapter on “Sexual Orientation” in HEAVEN CRAWLEY,
REFUGEES AND GENDER: LAW AND PROCESS (2001).
15
See, e.g., Krista Daley and Ninette Kelley, Particular Social Group: A Human Rights
Based Approach in Canadian Jurisprudence, 12 INT’L. J. REFUGEE L. 148 (2000);
Audrey Macklin, Cross-Border Shopping for Ideas: A Critical Review of United States,
Canadian, and Australian Approaches to Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 13 GEO.
IMMIGR. L. J. 25 (1998); Deborah Anker et al., Women Whose Governments Are Unable
or Unwilling to Provide Reasonable Protection from Domestic Violence May Qualify as
Refugees under United States Asylum Law, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 709 (1997).
16
In the whole pool of cases only 14% of the Canadian claims and 21% of the Australian
claims were brought by lesbians. Millbank, supra note 11, at 148.
17
Lesbian claimants in Canada had a 66% success rate while gay men had a 52%
success rate. Id.
18
A mere 7% of lesbian claimants succeeded in Australia, compared to 26% of gay men.
Id.
19
RRT Reference N98/23425 (Refugee Rev. Trib., Austl. Apr. 28, 1999).
20
Id. See also RRT Reference N99/27818 (Refugee Rev. Trib., Austl. June 29, 1999),
where the applicant’s husband battered her and attacked her with a knife on finding out
that she was in a lesbian relationship:
On her evidence her husband was only violent towards her and not towards
other homosexuals. I consider it was pique and jealousy towards her as an
individual that motivated his abuse of her. In stating this, I accept that the
unfamiliarity of being supplanted by a female rather than the normal male
lover would have caused him to resent the situation more. However, I am not
satisfied that the applicant would not have been abused by him if she had been
in a heterosexual extra-marital relationship.
In another case where the agent of persecution was a violent former husband the
Australian tribunal stated: “[T]he Applicant does not claim, and I do not consider, that the
particular problems she faces from her husband will be made worse by reason of the fact
that she has formed a lesbian relationship as distinct from a relationship with a man.”
RRT Reference N97/15064 (Refugee Rev. Trib., Austl. Nov. 4, 1997).
21
See, e.g., RRT Reference V98/09498 (Refugee Rev. Trib., Austl. Mar. 30, 1999) and
the partner’s case at RRT Reference V98/09501 (Refugee Rev. Trib., Austl. Mar. 31,
1999); RRT Reference N97/17155 (Refugee Rev. Trib., Austl. Sept. 23, 1998) and RRT
Reference N99/27818 (Refugee Rev. Trib., Austl. June 29, 1999).
22
E.g., a Chinese gay couple arrested having sex in a park and persecuted by the police
and other authorities were held not to have been persecuted “for reason of their
homosexuality per se.” RRT Reference N98/25853, N98/25980 (Refugee Rev. Trib.,
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